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Abstract
We develop a game-theoretic model to examine the entry of copycats and its implications by
incorporating two salient features, namely, two product attributes: physical resemblance and
product quality, and two consumer utilities: consumption utility and status utility. Our equilib-
rium analysis suggests that copycats with a high physical resemblance but low product quality
are more likely to enter the market successfully by defying the deterrence of the incumbent.
Furthermore, we show that higher quality can hinder copycat to successfully enter the market.
Finally, we show that the entry of copycats does not always improve consumer surplus and so-
cial welfare. In particular, when the quality of the copycat is sufficiently low, the loss in status
utility from consumers of the incumbent product overshadows the small gain in consumption
utility from buyers of the copycat, leading to an overall decrease in consumer surplus and social
welfare.
Keywords: Conspicuous consumption, copycat, counterfeit, entry deterrence, entry strategies,
pricing strategies.
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1 Introduction
“Fake goods aren’t totally bad, at least it created jobs at some counterfeit factories...
We don’t want to be a brand that nobody wants to copy.”
Prada CEO Patrizio Bertelli (2012)
Copycats are generally quickly (and sometimes illegally) produced, low-priced and lower-quality
replicas of products that enjoy substantial brand value (Lai and Zaichkowsky (1999)). As articu-
lated by Katz (1960) and Wilcox et al. (2009), many consumers knowingly purchase non-deceptive
copycats of luxury brands mainly due to the social status associated with the luxury brands. For
this reason, the market for copycat goods is huge. Last year, American border officials nabbed
copies that, had they been genuine, would have been worth $1.2 billion. Their European Union
counterparts seized EURO 768m ($1 billion) of fakes in 2013. But these were surely a fraction of
the counterfeits being peddled. Estimates for the total value of fakes sold worldwide each year go
as high as $1.8 trillion (The Economist, August 1, 2015).
Efficient supply networks, inconsistent law enforcement1, and large under-served markets have
enabled many firms in China and other developing countries to produce and sell imitation products.
A recent report issued by the United Nation suggests that 70% of all copycats of fashion and luxury
goods is produced in China. In fact, a new term “Shanzhai” has been created as a reference to
those imitations and copycats produced in China (Siu et al. (2010) and Tse et al. (2010)).2
In general, most copycat products tend to exhibit the following five characteristics:
1. High Resemblance. By definition, copycat products usually exhibit high resemblance of
genuine “branded” products in terms of brand names or external designs.
2. Low Selling Price. Copycat products are usually sold at low price partly because they
enjoy extremely low production cost, i.e., they incur no R&D costs, promotion and marketing
costs, licensing fees, etc.3
1For example, fashion design has no copyright protection laws, luxury brands such as Balmain and Givenchy
cannot file legal claims against Zara and NastyGal for copying their designs of boots and handbags, respectively
(Lieber (2014)). This legal loophole has created incentives for copycats to enter the market.
2In traditional Chinese history, Shanzhai means “mountain stronghold” in reference to historical warlord holdouts
which were outside of government control. This term is now being used to refer to products outside of government
regulations that are widely reflected in the numerous copycats mobile phones, apparels, watches, computers, and even
cars.
3For example, Shanzhai cell phone manufacturers ignored the requirement that they purchase a cell phone-
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3. Non-deceptive. Many copycat products are non-deceptive to the buyers in the sense
that the buyers are fully aware that the products are not genuine either from the price they
paid, or the channel from which the buyers buy the product. (Cho et al. (2015)). 4 However,
even though copycat products are non-deceptive to the buyers, their physical resemblance
level of the incumbent products can deceive other consumers in the market that the copycat
products are genuine. Therefore, when the resemblance level of the copycat product becomes
higher, it can deceive more people to perceive that the copycat is authentic. Consequently,
the “social utility” derived from a copycat product depends on the proportion of the market
perceives the product to be genuine, which depends on the physical resemblance level.
4. Low Quality. Relative to the luxury brand that they are mimicking, copycat products are
generally of low quality. For instance, the curator of the Fashion Institute of Technology
Ariele Elia commented that “With (genuine) designer items, there is quality.” (Lieber (2014)).
5. Rapid Product Launch. Partly due to its efficient supply chain (Siu et al. (2010)), most
copycat products are launched shortly after the launch of genuine brands.5
In emerging markets, copycats provide access of imitation products to those who either cannot
afford or are unwilling to pay the high selling price of these genuine luxury products. At the same
time, these copycats can generate profits from piggybacking on the product development of the
incumbent firms. To a certain extent, copycats are encroaching the market of the incumbent firm
and it raises major concerns from the incumbent’s perspective. These observations have motivated
us to examine the following research questions:
1. In the presence of a potential copycat, under what condition is it possible for the incumbent
manufacturing license (a requirement which the Chinese government abandoned in 2007 largely because it had become
unenforceable) (Sun et al. (2015)). As reported in the New York Times, a typical Shanzhai phone selling for $150
usually costs only $40 to produce in China (Barboza (2000)). For example, a copycat iPhone is sold at RMB600,
while the genuine iPhone is selling for RMB5888 by China Unicom.
4There are copycat products that are deceptive and consumers are not being notified that the products are not
genuine. In China, deceptive products such as fake drugs, milk powder and other food products have created major
concerns about food safety in China due to product adulteration (Tang and Babich (2014)). To avoid the the legal
issues associated with the loss of human lives due to the use of deceptive imitation foods, drugs, etc., we shall focus
on non-deceptive imitation durable goods in this paper.
5In some cases, the copycat products can be available even before the genuine branded goods. For example, Tom
Ford lamented that “I hate being copied by Zara.... (My items) will be (copied and sold) at Zara’s stores before I
can get them in the store, and I don’t like that.” (London (2013)).
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to deter its entry?
2. In the presence of a potential copycat, what is the incumbent’s pricing strategy?
3. Which type of copycat, in terms of physical resemblance and product quality, can gain suc-
cessful entry?
4. Will the presence of copycats always improve consumer surplus? What is the impact of the
presence of potential copycats on social welfare?
The first two questions are intended to examine the strategic dynamics between the incumbent
and the copycat, and to identify conditions under which the incumbent can deter the entrance of
copycats. The third question seeks to provide an explanation about why we tend to observe copycat
products of high resemblance and low quality in practice as discussed earlier. The fourth question
seeks to examine the conventional wisdom that copycats create additional consumer surplus and
social welfare as articulated by Prada CEO in 2012.
To examine the above research questions, we present a two-period dynamic game model to cap-
ture the strategic interactions between an incumbent (I) and a copycat (C) over two time periods.
Our model incorporates two salient features: (a) two types of copycat characteristics – resemblance
and quality relative to the incumbent product; and (b) two types of consumer utilities associat-
ed with a product – consumption utility that depends on the product quality, and status utility
that depends on the copycat’s resemblance level with the incumbent product and the consumer’s
purchasing decision of the incumbent and the copycat products.
Our equilibrium analysis enables us to establish the following answers to the above research
questions as follows:
1. Conditions under which the incumbent can deter copycat’s entry. When the production cost
of the incumbent is sufficiently close to that of the copycat’s, the incumbent should sell its
product at a lower price to capture the entire market (so as to deter the copycat’s entry). In
other words, the incumbent can afford to “flood the market” so as to deter the copycat’s entry.
This result is consistent with the way genuine musical CDs deter the entrance of copycats in
China in the 90s.
2. Implications of the potential entry of copycat on the incumbent’s selling price. Regardless of
the actual entry of the copycat, the potential threat associated with the copycat’s entry is
sufficient to force the incumbent to lower its selling price.
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3. Characteristics of copycats that can enter the market successfully without being deterred by
the incumbent. Our equilibrium analysis reveals that, when it is profitable for a copycat to
enter the market, its product tends to exhibit high resemblance and low quality (relative to
the incumbent product).
4. Implications of the potential entry of copycat on consumer surplus and social welfare. In
contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that the entry of a copycat does not always improve
consumer surplus or social welfare.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, contrary to extant literature on copycats,
our paper focuses exclusively on non-deceptive copycats whereby consumers know for certain, at
the point of purchase, that the copycat product is an imitation. Second, we present a model that
captures two salient features associated with copycat products: resemblance and quality of the
copycat product, as well as consumption and status utilities for the consumers. These features
have not been examined in the literature and thus offer a novel and substantive dimension to the
paper. Third, besides establishing pricing as a deterrence strategy that the incumbent should
adopt in equilibrium, our results explain why most copycat products tend to be high on physical
resemblance and yet low on quality. At the same time, we show that the presence of copycats is
not always beneficial in terms of consumer surplus and social welfare, despite conventional wisdom.
2 Related Literature
The extant literature on counterfeits (or copycats) has focused on the demand of copycats in which
price, attitude towards branded companies, and the need for status signaling have been cited as
the main factors of driving copycat demand. Examples include Han et al. (2010), Wilcox et al.
(2009), Bloch et al. (2003), Kwong et al. (2003), Tom et al. (1998), Cordell et al. (1996), Wee
et al. (1995). Using a Cournot competition model, Grossman and Shapiro (1988) studied the case
when the quality of the product is not observable. Much as the paper modeled products along
both dimensions of status and quality, status utility is modeled to be dependent on the brand
itself and independent of the number of buyers of the product. They concluded that policies that
deter copycats may not improve social welfare. This finding is consistent with Cho et al. (2015).
Qian (2014) examined the economic impact of copycats and the impact on the brand management
strategy of firms. Qian et al. (2014) further examined how incumbents may seek to differentiate
their products in response to entries by (deceptive) copycat entities. Qian et al. (2015), on the other
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hand, used a signaling model to examine how incumbents may seek to differentiate the products
along the dimensions of searchable and experiential qualities in response to entries by copycat
entities. Unlike the existing literature, we consider the case when the status utility of the genuine
product and that of the copycat depend on the number of buyers of each product.
Unlike this stream of research, we incorporate the social motivations for the consumption of
copycats of luxury brands into our framework to examine the strategic interactions between the
incumbent and the copycat. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that examines the
impact of non-deceptive copycats by explicitly incorporating both physical resemblance and quality
of the copycat product as well as the status utility of the consumers into the framework. To this
end, we provide a theoretical explanation as to why copycats observed in practice are often high on
physical resemblance but low on product quality. Furthermore, the issue of whether copycats bring
value to the consumers and society at large depends on the quality of the copycat. Our analysis
extends the findings in Grossman and Shapiro (1988) and Cho et al. (2015) that copycats can
bring value to the society. Specifically, our result reveals that quality is a key dimension that will
determine if it is indeed the case.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on limit pricing. Bain (1949) formally es-
tablished the notion of an incumbent’s decision to cut its prices to decrease the potential of entry.
Friedman (1979) on the other hand, argued that a credible threat to cut prices upon entry can
be sufficient to deter entry and is a more effective and profitable way for the incumbent. Spence
(1977, 1979) further expanded on the use of strategic commitments to deter entry. Hall (2009)
offered a review of this literature. In this paper, limit pricing exists as an equilibrium under some
conditions. We also elaborate on the commitment by the incumbent on its price going forward.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §3 and §4, we present the model and the
findings. In §5, we discuss the implications on consumer surplus and social welfare. In §6, we
discuss some extensions and conclude in §7. All proofs are provided in the appendix while the
complete backward induction analysis is given in the supplementary appendix.
3 Model
We describe the sequence of events before we formulate the market and consumer characteristics.
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3.1 Sequence of Events
We consider a two-period game with observable actions between the incumbent I and the copycat
firm C. At the beginning of Period 1, I launches a new product of intrinsic quality qI (normalized
to 1) and determines its selling price pI . Upon observing I’s product price pI , C first decides
whether to enter or to stay out of the market at the beginning of Period 2. If C enters, it enters
with a copycat product and sets it selling price pC .
6 The unit production cost for I is kI , where
kI ∈ (0, 1). We assume that the copycat’s unit production cost kC < kI . The reason for C to
enjoy a lower marginal cost of production is because C neither invests in promotion and regular
advertisement nor fulfils any regulatory or licensing requirement that will increase the marginal
cost of production. Upon observing pI , pC , α and q, each consumer makes her purchase decision
that maximizes her total (consumption and status) utility. The sequence of events is depicted in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Sequence of events
In our model, the copycat product is different from the incumbent product along two attributes:
(a) the physical resemblance α, where α ∈ (0, 1); and (b) the product quality q, where q ∈ (0, 1)
(i.e., the copycat product is of lower quality than that of the incumbent). As an initial attempt to
examine the implications of resemblance α and quality q of copycat products in a game theoretic
game, we shall assume both resemblance and quality of the copycat product are given exogenously.
This assumption enables us to explore which type of copycat tend to gain entry successfully in
equilibrium.
6The framework in which the incumbent sets the price before the copycat is also adopted in Qian (2014) and Qian,
Gong and Chen (2015).
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First, we use physical resemblance α to refer to the extent in which the products are physically
alike and the “likelihood” that the copycat product will be identified by the market as the incumbent
product. For instance, by copying prominent insignias used in luxury leather goods, a copycat
product can increase its physical resemblance α. In general, it is relatively less costly for the
copycat to increase its physical resemblance than to increase product quality.
We assume that the quality of the copycat product q is always strictly less than that of the
incumbent’s (i.e., q < 1). This assumption is reasonable and necessary for the following reason.
Suppose that the copycat product is of exactly the same quality as that of the incumbent’s. Then
the copycat can easily have a product that is an exact physical replica of the incumbent’s product.
In this case, owing to a lower marginal production cost, the copycat product is actually more
competitive than that of the incumbent product and the copycat can foreclose the incumbent’s
market, in which case, the copycat does not have anything in the market to ‘copy’. Imagine a
leather bag with an insignia that does not have a well-known brand attached to it. What value
is then of the copycat brand? Thus, for the framework to be relevant to the research question in
this paper, we assume that the quality of the copycat product is always lower than that of the
incumbent. Nonetheless, it can be sufficiently close (q close to 1).
3.2 Market Conditions
Our base model is based on the following market conditions. First, we assume that the time interval
between the two periods is so short that consumers are confronted with both products of I and
C at almost the same time if C chooses to enter the market. This assumption implies that there
is virtually no sales of the incumbent product in Period 1. As described earlier, this assumption
is observed in practice due to the speed at which C can enter the market. As stated earlier, Tom
Ford lamented that “(My items) will be (copied and sold) at Zara’s stores before I can get them in
the store.” (London (2013)). (To examine the robustness of our results obtained in the base model,
we shall relax this assumption in Section 6.1 so that the time interval between the two periods is
long enough so that the sales of the incumbent can take place in Period 1 before the entry of the
copycat in Period 2. By using the same approach to analyze this extension, we find that the key
results continue to hold.)
We incorporate the notion of irreversibility of the incumbent’s price pI in our model. As
highlighted in Spence (1977), irreversibility is a way for the firm to commit itself in advance and
a way to issue a credible threat to potential entry. Specifically, to avoid diluting the brand image,
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most luxury brands do not lower selling price or launch new products to compete with a copycat.
For this reason and for tractability, we shall assume that the incumbent will not change its selling
price and will not launch another product to compete with the copycat product upon its entry
(Figure 1).
3.3 Two Types of Consumer Utility
In our model, there are N (normalized to 1) infinitesimal consumers in the market: each consumer i
has wealth vi, where vi ∼ U [0, 1]. Instead of considering the case when social status is an increasing
function of wealth, we assume that Consumer i’s wealth vi corresponds perfectly to her social status
for ease of exposition. For each consumer, we first define the intrinsic consumption utility as well
as the status utility for buyers and non buyers derived from a “generic” product with a functional
quality q. (In Section 3.5., we shall describe how the status utility depends on the resemblance
factor α and the number of buyers who purchased Product I versus C.)
Consumption Utility for Buyers and Non-buyers. We model a consumer willingness to pay
(WTP) for a product of quality q as directly proportional to her wealth level vi so that the lifetime
utility from consumption is viq. In other words, if a consumer with wealth vi purchases a product
of quality q at price p, she obtains a net consumption utility of (viq − p). For non-buyers, the
consumption utility is equal to 0.
Status Utility for Buyers. Consider the case when there are a continuum [v, v] of buyers and a
continuum [0, v] of non-buyers. By adapting the status utility model developed by Rao and Schaefer
(2013), the entire group of buyers with vi ∈ [v, v] will share the same status utility, which can be
written as:7
λ
∫ v
v vidvi∫ v
v dvi
= λ
v + v
2
, (1)
where λ (λ ∈ (0, 1)) represents the consumer’s sensitivity towards status utility. Essentially, the
status utility is equal to the sensitivity λ times the expected wealth level of the buyers in the group.
Status Utility for Non-Buyers. To incorporate the notion of “social comparison”, the status
utility of the non-buyers should be lower than that of the buyers and it should depend on the
number of buyers and non-buyers. Therefore, if we set the status utility for non-buyers to 0, the
7Furthermore, if a consumer vj < v (vj > v) purchases the product, then the status utility of the existing group of
buyers in [v, v] will decrease (increase) because an additional consumer with lower (higher) wealth level is “joining”
the existing group of buyers.
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status utility for non-buyers will be independent of the wealth level of the non-buyers with wealth
[0, v] as well as the number of buyers and non-buyers. For this reason, we set the status utility for
the group of non-buyers with vi ∈ [0, v] as
λ
∫ v
0 vidvi∫ v
0 dvi
= λ
v
2
. (2)
Observe from (2) that the status utility for non-buyers is increasing in v. Hence, the status utility
for non-buyers can increase (decrease) when there are fewer (more) buyers for the product.
3.4 Consumer’s Threshold Purchasing Policy
Before we analyze the pricing strategies of I and C (with potential entry), we now examine the
consumer’s rational purchasing behavior in equilibrium. As we shall show later, regardless of
the entry of C, all rational consumers will follow a “threshold purchasing policy” in equilibrium.
Instead of proving similar threshold policies for different settings (I operates as a monopoly, I
and C operate as a duopoly with both incumbent and copycat products, etc.), we now present a
unified model to analyze the consumer’s purchasing policy in equilibrium so as to avoid repetition.
Without loss of generality, we shall consider the most general case in which both products from I
and C are available in the market. As we shall show later, all consumers will follow a threshold
purchasing policy [τC , τI ] that can be described as follows: (a) consumers with wealth vi ∈ [0, τC ]
will buy nothing, (b) consumers with wealth vi ∈ [τC , τI ] will buy C, and (c) consumers with wealth
vi ∈ [τI , 1] will buy I. Notice that the thresholds τC and τI depend on pI , pC , α, q and λ. Also,
it can be shown that this form of threshold purchasing policy is an equilibrium policy, i.e., no
consumer can improve her utility by deviating from this policy unilaterally.
3.5 Consumption Utility and Status Utility associated with a Threshold Pur-
chasing Policy
For any threshold purchasing policy [τC , τI ], we now determine the consumption utility and status
utility of three different groups of consumers: (1) buyers of I with wealth vi ∈ [τI , 1]; (2) buyers of
C with wealth vi ∈ [τC , τI ] ; and (3) non-buyers with wealth vi ∈ [0, τC ].
Consumption Utility. By using the consumption utility as defined in Section 3.2 along with the
fact that the quality of I is equal to 1 and the quality of C is equal to q, it is easy to check that
the consumption utility for each buyer of I is equal to (vi · 1− pI), for each buyer of C is equal to
(vi · q − pC), and for each non-buyer is equal to 0.
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Status Utility. We can use the same approach as presented in Section 3.2 to determine the
status utility of each of the three groups of consumers. However, in the presence of copycat C, the
status utility of each group depends on whether the market can identify the copycat product C as
“fake” or not. For this reason, we consider two separate cases by incorporating the notion of social
comparison as explained in Section 3.3 :
Case 1: The market cannot identify C as fake with probability α. When the market
cannot distinguish between the incumbent product I and the copycat product C, the market will
recognize the buyers of C and the buyers of I as having the same social status. Hence, both groups
of buyers will be treated as a “combined” group of buyers with wealth level vi ∈ [τC , 1]. By applying
(1), the buyers of I and the buyers of C will enjoy the same status utility, which is equal to λ1+τC2 .
By applying (2), the non-buyers will obtain a status utility of λ τC2 .
Case 2: The market can identify C as fake with probability (1−α). When the market can
clearly distinguish between the incumbent product I and the copycat product C, the market will
recognize the buyers of I are consumers with wealth level vi ∈ [τI , 1]. By applying (1), the buyers
of I will obtain a status utility λ1+τI2 . At the same time, the market recognizes that the buyers of
C are different from the buyers of I and they have a lower social status than the buyers of I. In
the base model, we assume that the market will treat the buyers of C as non-buyers (i.e., as if they
did not buy anything). Consequently, the buyers of C and those non-buyers will be treated as a
“combined” group of “non-buyers” with wealth level vi ∈ [0, τI ]. By applying (2), the buyers of C
and the non-buyers will enjoy the same status utility, which is equal to λ τI2 , which is lower than
that of the buyers of I. (In Section 6.2., we shall examine an alternative scenario under which the
buyers of C and non-buyers obtain different status utility.)
By considering the consumption utility and the status utility of these three groups of consumers
along with the probability associated with Case 1 (i.e., α) and Case 2 (i.e., (1−α)), we can compute
the total expected utility U(vi) for each consumer with wealth vi as follows:
U(vi) =

(vi · 1− pI) + λ(α1+τC2 + (1− α)1+τI2 ) if vi ∈ [τI , 1],
(vi · q − pC) + λ(α1+τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ) if vi ∈ [τC , τI ],
0 + λ(α τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ) if vi ∈ [0, τC ].
(3)
In summary, we have identified a threshold purchasing policy (τC , τI) that consumers will adopt
in equilibrium so that the demand for product I is equal to (1 − τI) and the demand for product
C is equal to (τI − τC). Also, we have determined the total expected utility of each consumer as
given in (3). In the next section, we shall use the demand functions of I and C along with the
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total expected utility of each consumer given in (3) to determine the pricing strategy for I and
the entrance and pricing strategy for C in equilibrium so that we can answer those four research
questions.
4 Analysis
We use backward induction to analyze the sequential game between I and C as depicted in Figure
1. First, we determine the threshold purchasing policy in Period 2 for any given pI , pC . Then we
derive the optimal pC as a function of pI and the entry decision of C. Finally, we determine the
optimal pI for I. Once we determine the optimal pI , we can retrieve the equilibrium outcomes
through substitutions as well as the entry strategy of C and the deterrence strategy of I, if any.
Let us recall the threshold purchasing policy under which a consumer with wealth vi will buy I
if vi ∈ [τI , 1], buy C if vi ∈ [τC , τI ], and buy nothing if vi ∈ [0, τC ]. Hence, by considering the total
expected utility as given in (3), we know that consumer with vi = τI is indifferent between buying
I or C, and consumer with vi = τC is indifferent between buying C or buying nothing. By using
these observations and (3), thresholds τI and τC satisfy the following equations simultaneously:
τI · 1− pI + λ(α1 + τC
2
+ (1− α)1 + τI
2
) = τI · q − pC + λ(α1 + τC
2
+ (1− α)τI
2
),
τC · q − pC + λ(α1 + τC
2
+ (1− α)τI
2
) = λ(α
τC
2
+ (1− α)τI
2
).
By solving these two equations, we get:
τI =
pI − pC − (1− α)λ2
1− q , and τC =
pC − αλ2
q
. (4)
4.1 Pricing Strategies of C and I
For any given threshold policy (τC , τI), the demand for product I is equal to (1 − τI) and the
demand for product C is equal to (τI −max(0, τC)). (Note that τC < 0 when pC is too low.) Also,
it is easy to check from (4) that Product I’s demand is decreasing in pI , while Product C’s demand
is decreasing in pC (due to smaller τI and bigger pC). We now use these demand characteristics to
determine the pricing strategies of C and I in equilibrium.
Given pI , we first determine the copycat C’s best response p
∗
C(pI). By noting that the demand
for Product C is equal to (τI −max(0, τC)), copycat C will determine its best response p∗C(pI) by
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solving the following problem:
max
pC
piC(pI , pC) = (pC − kC)(τI −max(0, τC))
s.t. τI ∈ [max(0, τC), 1],
where τI , τC are given in (4).
By considering the cases where τC is positive and negative and various boundary conditions,
we summarize the best response of C with respect to pI as follows:
1. When kC ≤ λα2 ,
p∗C(pI) =

pI − λ2 (1− α) if pI ∈ [0, kC + λ2 (1− α)],
kC+pI−λ2 (1−α)
2 if pI ∈ [kC + λ2 (1− α), λ2 (1 + α)− kC ],
λα
2 if pI ∈ [λ2 (1 + α)− kC , 1q (λ2 (α+ q)− kC)],
kC+qpI−λ2 (q−α)
2 if pI ≥ 1q (λ2 (α+ q)− kC)].
(5)
2. When kC >
λα
2 ,
p∗C(pI) =
 kC if pI < 1q (kC − λ2 (α− q))kC+qpI−λ2 (q−α)
2 , if pI ≥ 1q (kC − λ2 (α− q))
(6)
Anticipating Copycat C’s best response p∗C(pI) as given in (5) and (6) for different scenarios and
applying (4) along with the boundary constraints, Incumbent I can determine its optimal pricing
strategy p∗I by solving the following problem:
max
pI
piI(pI) = (pI − kI)(1− τI)
s.t. τI =
pI−p∗C(pI)−(1−α)λ2
1−q
τI ∈ [0, 1].
By considering p∗C(pI) as given in (5) and (6) for different ranges of values of pI , we obtain the
optimal p∗I for each of these ranges by solving the above problem. Then, we can retrieve the
equilibrium outcomes of all possible ranges. Due to the boundary constraints associated with the
incumbent’s problem as stated above and due to 6 different scenarios that affect C’s best response
p∗C(pI) as given in (5) and (6), the detailed expressions for the optimal p
∗
I for I and the corresponding
best response p∗C(p
∗
I) for C and the equilibrium profits for I and C are tedious. Given the focus
of our paper is to examine those 4 aforementioned research questions, we shall omit the detailed
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expressions of p∗I and p
∗
C(p
∗
I) for different scenarios in the main text. (The detailed expressions are
embedded in the proof as shown in Supplementary Appendix A.) Instead, we shall compare the
resulting profit of both firms associated with different scenarios to map out the entry and deterrence
strategies of C and I. This is the focus of the next subsection.
4.2 Entry and Deterrence Strategies of C and I
By considering the boundary conditions for p∗I along with those 6 different scenarios that affect C’s
best response p∗C(p
∗
I) as given in (5) and (6), we can compare the resulting profit of both firms to
map out the deterrence and entry strategies that I and C will adopt in equilibrium in terms of kI
and kC (Figure 2). Observe from Figure 2 that the lower right-hand corner corresponds to the case
when kI ≤ kC , which is inadmissible (because we assume that the production cost of I is higher
than that of C (i.e., kI > kC). Also, the upper left-hand corner of Figure 2 corresponds to the case
when the incumbent I does not enter the market because kI is too high. Without an incumbent
firm, there is no product to “copy” and so the problem becomes trite. Therefore, it suffices to
consider those shaded cases as depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Equilibrium strategies
To begin, let us examine the entry strategy of the copycat as well as the deterrence strategy
of the incumbent in equilibrium. Our main question is: Under what conditions can limit pricing
enable I to deter the entrance of C? Proposition 1 provides an answer.
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Proposition 1. (Entry Deterrence.) Copycat C will not enter the market in equilibrium if and
only if kI − kC ≤ λ(1−α)2 − 2(1− q) and kC ≤ λα2 .
Proposition 1 has the following implications. First, when kC ≤ λα2 , the incumbent I is able
to deter the entry of C when the cost differential between I and C (i.e., (kI − kC)) satisfies:
(kI − kC) ≤ λ(1−α)2 − 2(1 − q). Second, besides cost differential, the condition for deterrence is
likely to hold when the consumer’s sensitivity towards status utility (λ) is high, when the copycat’s
quality (q) is high, or when the copycat’s physical resemblance (α) is low. While Incumbent I
cannot control copycat’s quality q, Incumbent I can deter C’s entry by increasing λ. To do so, I
can enhance the status image through advertising as well as celebrity endorsements. Also, I can
deter C’s entry by designing a product that is difficult or costly for the copycat to replicate so that
α is kept low.
On the flip side, Proposition 1 reveals the condition when the incumbent I cannot deter the
entrance of C, say, for instance, kI − kC > λ(1−α)2 − 2(1 − q). Upon close examination of this
condition, we can conclude that the copycat can enter the market successfully with a product
that is high in physical resemblance α, and low in quality q. This result is consistent with the
characteristics of most copycat products that are commonly observed in practice. Furthermore, in
the event when the two product attributes (quality q and physical resemblance α) are correlated,
it is easy to check from those two conditions as stated in Proposition 1 that only copycat with low
quality q and high resemblance α can enter the market successfully.
While it is desirable for C to enter the market by offering products with high resemblance so
that buyers can enjoy a higher expected status utility, it is less obvious why C would prefer to enter
the market with low quality products. The rationale for low quality copycat can be explained as
follows. First, suppose C attempts to enter the market with a product that has a high quality (q
is close to 1) as well as high resemblance (α is close to 1). Then all consumers, regardless of their
wealth level, will either prefer the product of I or that of C. This preference is determined solely
by the prices pI , pC . Hence, this entry strategy of copycat C will trigger a price war between I
and C, and the chances for obtaining market share for C is limited. Clearly, it is not optimal for
C, as a copycat firm that leverages on the status utility that the incumbent provides, to ‘kick’ the
incumbent out of the market. If that happens, the value of the product of C immediately diminishes
and C will end up with no demand as well - imagine a Prada look-a-like bag when Prada is no
longer in the market.8 Second, suppose C attempts to enter the market with a product with high
8In our model, we do not consider the possibility that C builds up its own brand while being a copycat.
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resemblance level (α is close to 1) and low quality (q is close to 0). Then, it becomes clear that the
deterrence condition stated in Proposition 1 does not hold. In this case, to gain some market share,
C has to set pC sufficiently low so that the incumbent I cannot afford to undercut C’s price and
stay profitable. Consequently, the incumbent I cannot afford to deter C’s entry, and the market is
segmented between I and C.
Next, let us consider the case when C can gain access to the market (i.e., without being deterred
by I). Given successful market entry, would C benefit from offering a product with higher quality?
The following proposition provides an answer.
Proposition 2. (Copycat’s Profit is Non-Monotonic in Quality.) When kC ∈ [λα2 − (1 −
q), kI ], kI ∈ [min(−2kC+ λ2 (1+2α)−(1−q), λα2 ),max(λ2 +(1−q), 12−q (kC− λα2 )+ λα2 + 2(1−q)2−q )], copycat
C will enter the market successfully in equilibrium. However, the profit of C is non-monotonic in
its quality level q.
Proposition 2 further affirms that higher product quality does not always generate higher profit
for the copycat, even when the conditions for successful entry have been satisfied and the cost of
producing a higher-quality product is ignored. This is because a higher-quality copycat product
inevitably triggers a more intense pricing competition between I and C. However, under the
conditions above when both kC , kI are relatively large, intense pricing competition can lead to the
copycat dropping out of the market. As such, the copycat is better off by entering the market with
a product of a lower quality.
5 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare
It is clear that successful entry of C will enable consumers with lower wealth level vi ∈ [τC , τI ]
to gain access to the copycat product at a lower price (instead of the incumbent product that
they may not be able to afford (or willing) to buy). In addition, buying the copycat product can
enable the buyers to obtain consumption utility and perhaps even status utility (especially when the
market cannot identify the copycat product as fake). Therefore, conventional wisdom has it that
the presence of C would improve both consumer surplus and social welfare (in terms of consumer
surplus and the total profit of both I and C). Is this conventional wisdom always true?
While this belief is correct in many instances, we find that that are instances under which the
presence of copycat C will actually reduce consumer surplus and/or social welfare. To construct
a specific counter example to show that the presence of copycat C can reduce consumer surplus
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and/or social welfare, we shall compare the consumer surplus and social welfare between 2 cases:
(a) the benchmark case when I operates as a monopoly without any potential entry threat from
copycat C; and (b) when I and C co-exist and capture the entire market together when
kC ∈ [λα
2
− (1− q), λα
2
], (7)
kI ∈ [min(λα
2
+ (1− q), λ
2
− 2(1− q)
2− q +
4− q
q(2− q)(−kC +
λα
2
))].
In preparation, let us compute the consumer surplus and social welfare associated with cases (a)
and (b) in the following subsections.
5.1 Incumbent I Operates as a Monopoly
Consider the benchmark (Case (a)) when I is the only firm in the market without any potential
entry threat of the copycat. When I operates as a monopoly, the corresponding game becomes
a single-person decision problem. Specifically, upon observing pI , the corresponding threshold
purchasing policy is: buy I if vi ∈ [τBI , 1]; and buy nothing, otherwise. Hence, by applying (3) to
this special case and by using the approach as presented in Sections 4 and 4.1, we can show that
pBI =
1+kI
2 +
λ
4 , τ
B
I =
1+kI
2 − λ4 , and piBI = (1−kI2 + λ4 )2, where the superscript/subscript ‘B’ is used
to denote the benchmark case.
Before we compute the consumer surplus and social surplus for the case when I operates as
a monopoly, we notice that the optimal monopoly price pBI is higher than the optimal price p
∗
I
associated with the scenario when C is present but deterred from entry. Specifically, we have:
Corollary 1. The potential threat associated with the copycat’s entry can pressure Incumbent I to
lower its selling price: pBI > p
∗
I .
Corollary 1 reveals that, in the presence of a copycat, its potential entry is sufficient to force
the incumbent to lower it selling price in equilibrium. This result suggests the presence of copycat
can increase consumer surplus due to a lower selling price of the incumbent product.
By using pBI and τ
B
I and pi
B
I as stated above, we can compute the consumer surplus as follows:
9
9Because the copycat C does not exist in the Benchmark case, the copycat’s resemblance level α and quality q are
irrelevant to the consumer surplus CSB and social welfare SSB .
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CSB =
∫ 1
τBI
[vi − pBI + λ
1 + τBI
2
]dvi +
∫ τBI
0
λ
τBI
2
dvi
=
(τBI )
2
2
+ (
λ
2
− 1)τBI +
1
2
=
1
8
((1− kI)2 − λ
2
4
+ 2λ).
Also, the social surplus is simply the sum of the consumer surplus and the profit of I so that:
SSB = CSB + pi
B
I
=
(τBI )
2
2
+ (
λ
2
− 1)τBI +
1
2
+ (
1− kI
2
+
λ
4
)2
=
1
8
((1− kI)2 − λ
2
4
+ 2λ) + (
1− kI
2
+
λ
4
)2.
5.2 Both Incumbent I and Copycat I Co-exist in the Market
Consider Case (b) when both I and C co-exist in the market under the conditions stated in (7).
The calculation of the consumer surplus for a consumer depends on the aforementioned threshold
purchasing policy and the entry and pricing strategies of both I and C, which in turn depends on
those 6 scenarios as depicted in (5) and (6). For ease of exposition, we shall state the consumer
surplus and the social surplus below and refer the reader to Appendix B for details.
CS =
1− q
2
(τI)
2 + (τI)(
λ
2
(1− α)− (1− q)) + 1
2
,
SS = CS + piI + piC
=
1− q
2
(τI)
2 + (τI)(
λ
2
(1− α)− (1− q)) + 1
2
+
1
1− q (
−kI + λ2 + (1− q)
2
)2
+
1
1− q (
λα
2
− kC)(
kI − λ2 + (1− q)
2
),
and τI =
1
2(1−q)(1 − q + kI − λ2 ) and piI = 14(1−q)(−kI + λ2 + (1 − q))2 and piC = 12(1−q)(λα2 −
kC)(kI − λ2 + (1− q)) corresponds to the profit of I and C under the specified conditions as stated
in Case (b).
Since CS and SS are complex function of q, to illustrate, we examine the difference between
CS and CSB and the difference between SS and SSB numerically by considering the case when
kC = 0.3, kI = 0.4, λ = 0.9, α = 0.95, and q ∈ [0.2, 0.4], which satisfy (7). It is easy to observe
from Figures 3a and 3b that CS < CSB and SS < SSB when q is sufficiently low. This is to say,
the entry of copycat C can lower the consumer surplus and social welfare when q is below a certain
threshold.
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(a) CS − CSB (b) SS − SSB
Figure 3: A case when CS and SS are smaller than the benchmark case
This observation that the entry of copycat C can lower the consumer surplus and social welfare
when q is below a certain threshold has motivated us to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3. (Consumer Surplus and Social Surplus.) Relative to the Benchmark case in
which Copycat C is absent from the market, the presence of copycat can reduce consumer surplus
and social welfare when copycat’s quality q is sufficiently low. In other words, CSB > CS and
SSB > SS when q is sufficiently small. Specifically, as q converges to 0, CSB − CS converges to
λα
2 (
1+kI
2 − λ4 ) > 0. Also, SSB − SS converges to kC(1+kI2 − λ4 ) > 0.
Proposition 3 provides a counter example to illustrate that the presence of copycat can indeed
reduce consumer surplus and social welfare when the copycat’s quality q is sufficiently low. This
result can be explained as follows. Consider the case when copycat C enters the market with
quality q closed to 0. By noting from above that τI converges to τ
B
I when (7) hold and that the
corresponding τC is equals to 0, we can conclude that the presence of copycat in this case will
entice the same group of consumers with wealth vi ∈ [τBI , 1] to buy the incumbent product as
in the Benchmark case. However, the presence of copycat will entice the consumers with wealth
vi ∈ [0, τBI ] to buy the copycat product so that the entire market is captured by both firms I and C.
In this case, Copycat C’s entry will increase consumption utility (due to those buyers of the copycat
product C). However, this gain is overshadowed by the loss in the status utility of those buyers
of the incumbent product I (due to the resemblance level of the copycat product). Consequently,
the presence of copycat can reduce consumer surplus and social welfare when copycat’s quality q
is sufficiently low. In summary, much as copycat products seem to bring value to consumers who
would not purchase the incumbent product otherwise, we find that there are instances under which
the presence of the copycat product can reduce consumer surplus and social welfare.
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6 Extensions
To examine the robustness of our results associated our base model as stated in Propositions 1, 2,
and 3 as well as Corollary 1, we now examine two different extensions.
6.1 Extension 1: Sequential Sales of I and C
In the base model as depicted in Figure 1, we have assumed that Period 1 is very short so that
there is no sales of the incumbent product in Period 1. Hence, the sales of both I and C take place
in Period 2. We now extend our analysis to the case when time interval between the introduction
of the incumbent’s product and the copycat product is sufficiently large so that the sales of product
I can take place in Period 1. More formally, we consider a sequential game that is associated with
the following sequence of events.
At the beginning of Period 1, I launches a new product of intrinsic quality 1 and determines
its selling price pI . Upon observing I’s price (pI), consumers with wealth level vi ∈ [0, 1] decide
whether to buy I or not. Here, we assume that consumers in Period 1 are strategic: they make
their purchase decisions by taking into account the potential entry of a copycat product C and it
selling price pC in Period 2. At the beginning of Period 2, C first decides whether to enter or to
stay out of the market. If C enters, it enters with a product with quality q and physical resemblance
α as before. At the same time, C decides on prices pC . As before, we assume that the incumbent
will continue its commitment (in the context of irreversibility) by not adjusting it price in Period
2. Due to the fact that sales can take place in Periods 1 and 2, we introduction the discount factor
δ (δ ∈ [0, 1]) to capture the time value of money.
Figure 4: Sequence of events for Extension 1
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By using the same approach as presented in Section 4 (the details are provided in Supplementary
Appendix B), we can show that the main results obtained in the base model (i.e., Propositions 1,
2, and 3 and Corollary 1) continue to hold as follows:
Proposition 4. (Entry Deterrence.) Suppose kI > kC . Copycat C does not enter at the
equilibrium if and only if kI − δkC ≤ λ(1−α)2 − 2(1− δq) and kC ≤ λα2 .
Observe that Proposition 4 is identical to Proposition 1 when the discount factor δ = 1. To
explain this result, observe that I can deter C’s entry only when the incumbent I can capture
the entire market, which can occur only when the thresholds τI = τC = 0. This deterrence
condition is essentially the same under the base model and the extension except the discount factor
δ. Consequently, the structure of Proposition 1 is preserved except that the boundary conditions
are adjusted to capture the discount factor δ. By considering the flip side, we can also conclude
that C can gain entry by offering a product that is high on resemblance and low on quality.
Proposition 5. (Non-Monotonicity in Quality.) When λα2 −(1−δq) ≤ kC ≤ kI , min(−2δkC+
λ
2 (1+δ+2δα)−(1−δq), λα2 ) ≤ kI ≤ max(λ2 (1+δ)+(1−δq), 12−δq (2(1−δq)− δλα2 +δkC)+ λ2 (1+δ)),
C always enters at the equilibrium but its profit is non-monotonic in q.
Next, when the copycat successfully enters the market and competes with the incumbent in
Period 2, a high quality copycat product can attract intensive pricing competition from the incum-
bent (by setting a lower price in Period 1). Hence, the profit of the copycat is non-monotonic in
the quality. This explains why Proposition 5 is akin to Proposition 2.
Regardless of whether the sales of Products I and C take place in Period 2 only (as in the base
case) or in Periods 1 and 2 respectively, the underlying threat imposed by the potential entry of C
in Period 2 can pressure I to lower its price in Period 1 (compared to the case when I operates as
a monopoly). This intuition continues to hold in this extension. Hence, Corollary 1 continues to
hold in this extension as stated in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. In the sequential game as depicted in Figure 4, the potential threat associated with
the copycat’s entry can also pressure Incumbent I to lower its selling price: pBI > p
∗
I .
Finally, consider the following conditions that are akin to (7):
kI ∈ [−2δkC+λ
2
(1+δ+2δα)−(1−δq),min(1−δq+λ
2
(1+δ),
λ
2
(1+δ)+
1
2− δq (
4− δq
q
(
λα
2
−kC)−2(1−δq)))],
kC ∈ [λα
2
− (1− δq), λα
2
].
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By using the fact that these conditions ensure both I and C co-exist and capture the entire market,
we get:
Proposition 6. (Consumer Surplus and Social Surplus.) Relative to the Benchmark case in
which copycat C is absent from the market, the presence of copycat can reduce consumer surplus
and social welfare when copycat’s quality q is sufficiently low. In other words, CSB > CS and
SSB > SS when q is sufficiently small. Specifically, as q converges to 0, (CSB −CS) converges to
δαλ
2 (
1+kI
2 − λ(1+δ)4 ) > 0. Also, (SSB − SS) converges to δkC(1+kI2 − λ(1+δ)2 ) > 0.
In the same vein, when the negative externality generated by the copycat product is sufficient
large, it overshadows any gain from the consumption utility of copycat buyers. This explains why
Proposition 6 is akin to Proposition 3.
6.2 Extension 2: An Alternative Formulation of Status Utility
Recall from Section 3.5 that we have formulated the consumption utility and the status utility for
three different groups of consumers associated with a threshold purchasing policy (τC , τI) so that
the total expected utility U(vi) for each consumer with wealth vi is given in (3). This formulation
is based on one key assumption as stated in Case 2 in Section 3.5. Specifically, when the market
can identify C as fake with probability (1 − α), we have assumed that the market will treat the
buyers of C as non-buyers (i.e., as if they did not buy anything) so that the buyers of C and those
non-buyers will be treated as a “combined” group of “non-buyers” with wealth level vi ∈ [0, τI ].
Based on this assumption, the buyers of C and the non-buyers have the same status utility λ τI2 .
One may argue that, when the market can identify C as fake, the buyers of C and non-buyers
of both I and C should not share the same status utility.10 There are certainly many plausible
alternatives especially when there is no formal analysis of status utility comparison between buyers
of C and non-buyers in the literature. In the absence of a grounded theory, we shall consider one
alternative scenario for illustrative purposes. We consider the following scenario. When the market
can identify C as fake, the market will recognize the buyers of I are consumers with wealth level
vi ∈ [τI , 1]. By applying (1), the buyers of I will obtain a status utility λ1+τI2 . Also, relative
to the buyers of I, the market will recognize the buyers of C as a different group of consumers
who purchased a product with lower social status. Specifically, the market will treat the buyers
as consumers with wealth level vi ∈ [τC , τI ] so that the buyers of C will obtain a status utility
10We thank an anonymous reviewer for his/her suggestion.
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λ τC+τI2 . Finally, relative to the buyers of I, the market will treat the non-buyers as consumers with
wealth level vi ∈ [0, τI ] (as non-buyers of I) so that these non-buyers will obtain a status utility
λ τI2 . Unlike the base model, the buyers of C have a higher status utility than the non-buyers in
this scenario. This is certainly a plausible scenario where a copycat product grants its owner a
higher social utility than not owning any product at all, particularly so in developing societies. As
we shall see, the key results obtained in the base model continue to hold in this setting.
By considering the consumption utility stated in Section 3.5 and the status utility associated
with the case when the market cannot identify C as fake (i.e., Case 1 in Section 3.5) and the case
when the market can identify C as fake as stated above, we can compute the total expected utility
U(vi) as before for each consumer with wealth vi as follows:
U(vi) =

(vi · 1− pI) + λ(α1+τC2 + (1− α)1+τI2 ) if vi ∈ [τI , 1],
(vi · q − pC) + λ(α1+τC2 + (1− α) τI+τC2 ) if vi ∈ [τC , τI ],
0 + λ(α τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ) if vi ∈ [0, τC ].
(8)
As expected, the total expected utility U(vi) given in (8) under the alternative scenario resembles
(3) as in the base case except the status utility of the buyers of C. By using the same approach
as presented in Section 4 (the details are provided in Supplementary Appendix C), we can show
that the main results obtained in the base model (i.e., Propositions 1, 2, and 3 and Corollary 1)
continue to hold. To avoid repetition, we omit the details here. Essentially, the underlying intuition
regarding why our results continue to hold in this scenario is the same as explained in Section 6.1.
For instance, I can deter C’s entry only when the incumbent I can capture the entire market,
which can occur only when the thresholds τI = τC = 0. In this case, there are no buyers of C and
there are no non-buyers. Hence, considering a different status utility for the buyers of C in our
scenario has no impact on the deterrence condition as stated in Proposition 1. Hence, Proposition
1 continues to hold in this scenario. By using the same approach as presented in Section 4, we
can show that the structure of all other results as stated in Propositions 2 and 3 and Corollary 1
continue to hold.
7 Conclusion
Copycats of luxury brands are prevalent in the market place. This paper seeks to better understand
their entry strategy, the deterrent strategy for the luxury brands, if any, as well as the implica-
tions for consumers and the society at large. We have developed a model to capture two salient
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features: (a) consumption utility and status utility; and (b) resemblance level and product quality
of the copycat product (relative to the incumbent luxury brand product). By solving a dynamic
game between the incumbent and the copycat, we have identified the conditions under which the
incumbent can deter the entry of the copycats.
Our analysis reveals that a copycat can gain entry to the market successfully (without being
blocked by the incumbent) by launching a product that exhibits high resemblance and low quality.
This result provides an explanation regarding why most copycat products available in the market
tend to have high resemblance and yet low quality.
We have shown that the conventional wisdom that the presence of copycat product can always
increase consumer surplus and social welfare is not true. Specifically, when the copycat’s product
quality is sufficiently low, we have identified specific instances under which the presence of the
copycat can actually reduce consumer surplus and social welfare. This finding suggests that the
quote by Patrizio Bertelli (2012) can be modified as follows: copycats are totally bad except when
the quality of these copycats are not too low.
There are several limitations to our modeling framework. Firstly, we have assumed in the base
model that copycats may enter the market speedily, presenting its products to consumers at the
same time as the incumbent. To address this issue, we have showed in Extension 1 that, even
when this assumption is relaxed and the incumbent’s product is launched way before the copycat,
the key results obtained in the base model continue to hold. Secondly, we have also checked for
robustness of our formulation of the status utility of consumers. An alternative formulation of the
status utility of copycat buyers is considered in Extension 2. We showed that even when copycat
buyers can obtain a higher status utility than that of the non-buyers of either products (i.e., I or
C), our key results continue to hold, albeit with different boundary conditions.
Next, we have assumed throughout that the incumbent does not develop a lower-quality product
to compete directly with the copycat. In a way, our findings actually lend support to this assumption
because it was found that successful copycat entrants are likely to be high in physical resemblance
to the incumbent’s product but low in quality. This segmentation strategy of the copycat is to
avoid intensive pricing competition from the incumbent in order to ensure its own successful entry.
Thus, the copycat will not choose a quality that is sufficiently high that will enable the incumbent
to develop another product to compete directly with it. As a future research, it is of interest to
explore the conditions under which the incumbent would launch a lower quality product to compete.
Finally, in our base model and Extension 2, we have assumed that the buyers of C will always
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obtain a higher status utility than the non-buyers (who bought nothing). However, when the market
can identify C as fake, it is possible that the market may view buyers of C to have a lower status
utility than the non-buyers. There is existing research suggesting that the status of the buyers of
C can be even lower than the non-buyers. This result is due to ‘loss of face’ when the buyers of C
are known to be buying fake products in certain product categories or in certain sub-culture that
owners of copycats have a lower social standing (Gentry et al., 2006; Wilcox et al., 2009; and Grubb
and Grathwohl, 1967). The analysis of this scenario is complex because there exist instances under
which a different threshold purchasing policy will occur: consumers with wealth vi ∈ [τI , 1] will buy
I; consumers with wealth vi ∈ [τC , τI ] do not buy anything because they are not wealthy enough to
buy I and they are afraid of lower status utility if they were exposed; and consumers with wealth
vi ∈ [0, τC ] would buy C. Because of the non-contiguous purchasing policy under this scenario, the
corresponding analysis is highly complex and our key results in the base model no longer hold. We
shall defer this scenario as future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Propositions 1-6 and Corollary 1-2
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Outline of the proof:
Applying backward induction, C chooses its entry decision optimally in the second stage given pI . We will
show that under the conditions presented in Proposition 1 , I is optimal to select a pI in the first stage such
that C cannot select any pC to have a positive profit if entering. Specifically, we divide the proof in two
cases, i.e., kC ≤ λα2 and kC > λα2 . In the first case, when kC ≤ λα2 , we show that under the conditions in
Proposition 1, C’s best response in the second stage leads to τI = 0. Therefore, C cannot enter the market.
In the second case, when kC >
λα
2 , we will show that there is no feasible conditions under which I is optimal
to choose a price such that C cannot have a positive profit. Therefore, C always enters the market when
kC >
λα
2 . Combining these two cases, we have Proposition 1. In the following, we present the details of the
proof.
Consumer purchasing decisions. τ1 is solved by τI ·1−pI+λ(α 1+τC2 +(1−α) 1+τI2 ) = τI ·q−pC+λ(α 1+τC2 +
(1− α) τI2 ). We get τI =
pI−pC−(1−α)λ2
1−q . τC can be solved similarly by τC · q− pC + λ(α 1+τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ) =
λ(α τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ). We have τC =
pC−αλ2
q .
Firm pricing decision
Case 1. kC ≤ λα2
Applying backward induction, we first consider Period 2.
Period 2
C does not enter the market if τI ≤ 0, which is equivalent to pC ≥ pI − λ2 (1 − α). Since τC ≤ τI , τC has
to be smaller than 0 if C cannot enter the market. So we will only consider the case when τC ≤ 0, which is
equivalent to pC ≤ λα2 . Now suppose C can ensure to price not larger than pI − λ2 (1− α). Then in Period
2, C maximizes its profit with respect to price pC under those constraints on pC .
max piC(pI) = (pC − kC)τI
s. t. pC ≤ λα
2
pC ≤ pI − λ
2
(1− α)
We have the optimal price,
p∗C(pI) =

pI − λ2 (1− α), if pI ∈ [0, kC + λ2 (1− α)]
kC+pI−λ2 (1−α)
2 , if pI ∈ [kC + λ2 (1− α), λ2 (1 + α)− kC ]
λα
2 , if pI >
λ
2 (1 + α)− kC
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Hence, there are three scenarios depending on I’s price in Period 1. In the first scenario, τI = 0; in the
second scenario, τI ≥ 0 and if p∗I = kC + λ2 (1−α) is the solution in the first period, τI = 0; while in the last
scenario, τI > 0. So we are only interested in the first two scenarios where C might be out of the market.
Period 1
In Period 1, I maximizes its profit with respect to price pI . I should also ensure τI ≤ 1 to have nonnegative
demand.
Scenario 1.1: pI ∈ [0, kC + λ2 (1 − α)]. In this scenario, τI = 0 which satisfies the condition τI ≤ 1
automatically. Since I covers the whole market, C will not enter the market.
Scenario 1.2: pI ∈ [kC + λ2 (1 − α), λ2 (1 + α) − kC ]. In this scenario, τC < 0 and τI ≥ 0. p∗C(pI) =
kC+pI−λ2 (1−α)
2 . τI ≤ 1 implies pI ≤ 2(1 − q) + kC + λ2 (1 − α). I maximizes its own profit function under
those listed constraints on pI .
max piI = (pI − kI)(1− τI(pI))
s. t. pI ≤ 2(1− q) + kC + λ
2
(1− α)
pI ≤ λ
2
(1 + α)− kC
pI ≥ kC + λ
2
(1− α)
Only when λ(1−α)2 − 2(1 − q) ≥ kI − kC , kC + λ2 (1 − α) is the optimal price, which implies τI = 0.
In this case, C cannot enter the market. Combining these two scenarios, we have when λα2 ≥ kC and
λ(1−α)
2 − 2(1− q) ≥ kI − kC , C does not enter the market.
Case 2. kC >
λα
2
Period 2
Since kC >
λα
2 , we have pC ≤ λα2 < kC when τC ≤ 0. Hence, C cannot make positive profit margin if
entering. Therefore, C will always make sure τC > 0. Suppose τC > 0, C can enter the market if pC ≥ kC
and τI > τC . C maximizes its profit with respect to price pC
max piC(pI) = (pC − kC))(τI − τC)
s. t. pC ≥ kC
pC ≤ qpI − λ
2
(q − α)
We have the optimal price
p∗C(pI) =
 kC , if pI ≤ 1q (kC − λ2 (α− q))]kC+qpI−λ2 (q−α)
2 , if pI ≥ 1q (kC − λ2 (α− q))
Hence, there are two scenarios depending on I’s price in Period 1. In the first scenario, C cannot make
positive profit; in the second scenario, if p∗I =
1
q (kC − λ2 (α − q)), C also cannot have a positive margin.
Period 1
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Scenario 2.1: pI ∈ [0, 1q (kC − λ2 (α− q))]. In this scenario, C cannot get positive profit margin. C will not
enter the market.
Scenario 2.2: pI ≥ 1q (kC− λ2 (α−q)) In this scenario, τC > 0 and τI > τC . p∗C(pI) =
kC+qpI−λ2 (α−q)
2 . τI ≤ 1
implies pI ≤ 12−q (2(1 − q) + kC − λ2 (α + q) + λ). I maximizes its own profit function given the constraints
on pI .
max piI = (pI − kI)(1− τI(pI))
s. t. pI ≤ 1
2− q (2(1− q) + kC −
λ
2
(α+ q) + λ)
pI ≥ 1
q
(kC − λ
2
(α− q))
In both scenarios, we know C cannot have positive margin only when p∗I =
1
q (kC − λ2 (α − q)), which is
equivalent to kI ≤ λ2 + 12−q ( 4−3qq (λα2 − kC) − 2(1 − q)) and kC ≥ λα2 + q. It can be shown that these two
conditions cannot both hold given kI ≥ kC . Therefore, C can always enter the market. Hence, we have
Proposition 1.
Supplementary Appendix A gives the detailed backward induction analysis of this game. Before we show the
proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, we first highlight the main results in the Supplementary Appendix
A. Define
p0 := kC +
λ
2 (1− α) pi0 := kC + λ2 (1− α)− kI
p1 :=
kI+2(1−q)+kC+λ2 (1−α)
2 pi1 :=
1
2(1−q) (
2(1−q)+kC+λ2 (1−α)−kI
2 )
2
p3 :=
λ
2 (1 + α)− kC pi3 := 11−q (1− q − λα2 + kC)(λ2 (1 + α)− kC − kI)
p4 :=
kI+(1−q)+λ2
2 pi4 :=
1
1−q (
1−q+λ2−kI
2 )
2
p7 :=
kI+
2(1−q)−λα
2
+kC
2−q +
λ
2
2 pi7 :=
2−q
2(1−q) (
2(1−q)−λα
2
+kC
2−q +
λ
2−kI
2 )
2
l1 := kC +
λ
2 (1− α)− 2(1− q) l2 := 2(1− q) + kC + λ2 (1− α)
l3 := −3kC + 3λα2 + λ2 − 2(1− q) l5 := λ2 + λα− 2kC − (1− q)
l6 := 1− q + λ2 l8 := λα2 − q(1− q)
l9 :=
λ
2 +
1
2−q (
4−q
q (
λα
2 − kC)− 2(1− q)) l10 := 12−q (2(1− q)− λα2 + kC) + λ2
(Equilibrium Case 1) When kC ≤ λα2 and kI ∈ [kC , l1], the copycat C will not enter the market. As incum-
bent I operates as a monopoly, it will set its price pI,1 = p0 and earns a profit piI,1 = pi0 in equilibrium.
Also, τI,1 = 0 so that the incumbent will capture the entire market.
(Equilibrium Case 2) When kC ≤ λα2 and kI ∈ [l1,min(l2, l3)], copycat C will enter the market with
pC,2 =
1
4 (kI +3kC− λ2 (1−α)+2(1− q)), τC,2 = 14q (kI +3kC− λ2 (1+3α)+2(1− q)) < 0, piC,2 = 116(1−q) (kI −
kC− λ2 (1−α)+2(1−q))2. Also, incumbent I will set pI,2 = p1 and τI,2 = 14(1−q) (2(1−q)+kI−kC− λ2 (1−α))
so that piI,2 = pi1.
(Equilibrium Case 3) When kI ∈ [l3, l5], C enters the market with pC,3 = λα2 , τC,3 = 0, and piC,3 =
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1
1−q (
λα
2 − kC)2. Also, the incumbent will set pI,3 = p3 and τI,3 = 11−q (λα2 − kC) so that piI,3 = pi3.
(Equilibrium Case 4) When kI ∈ [l5,min(l6, l9)], C enters the market with pC,4 = λα2 , τC,4 = 0, and
piC,4 =
1
2(1−q) (
λα
2 −kC)(kI− λ2 +(1−q)). Also, the incumbent will set pI,4 = p4 and τI,4 = 12(1−q) (1−q+kI− λ2 )
so that piI,4 = pi4.
(Equilibrium Case 5) When kI ∈ [min
{
max
(
l5, l9
)
, λα2
}
, l10], kC ∈ [l8, 1], C enters the market and set-
s pC,5 =
q
4kI − λq8 +
2q(1−q)+(4−q)kC+(4−3q)λα2
4(2−q) and τC,5 = τ
5
I − 14q(1−q) (qkI + 2q(1−q)2−q + λq2 ) so that piC,5 =
q
16(1−q) (kI−λ2+ 2(1−q)2−q + 4−3qq(2−q) (λα2 −kC))2. Also, the incumbent sets pI,5 = p7 and τI,5 = 2−q4(1−q) (
2(1−q)+λα2 −kC
2−q −
λ
2 + kI) so that piI,5 = pi7.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Given the profits of C in different equilibrium cases, we first show how they are affected by q. Then
those cases where piC is not monotonic in q are identified.
Equilibrium Case 1: C does not enter the market.
Equilibrium Case 2: piC,2 =
1
1−q (
kI−kC−λ2 (1−α)+2(1−q)
4 )
2.
∂piC,2
∂q =
1
16(1−q)2 (kI−kC− λ2 (1−α)+2(1−q))(kI−
kC − λ2 (1− α)− 2(1− q)). Due to the boundary condition that kI ∈ (kC + λ2 (1− α)− 2(1− q),min(kC +
λ
2 (1− α) + 2(1− q),−3kC + λ2 (1 + 3α)− 2(1− q))), we have ∂piC,2∂q ≤ 0. Therefore, profit of C in Case 2 is
decreasing in q.
Equilibrium Case 3: piC,3 =
1
1−q (
λα
2 − kC)2. The profit of C in Case 3 is easily to be seen as increasing in
q.
Equilibrium Case 4: piC,4 =
1
1−q (
λα
2 − kC)(
kI−λ2+(1−q)
2 ).
∂piC,4
∂q =
1
2(1−q)2 (kI − λ2 )(λα2 − kC). Due to the
boundary condition that kC ∈ [λα2 − (1 − q), λα2 ], kI ∈ [−2kC + λ2 (1 + 2α) − (1 − q),min(λ2 + (1 − q), λ2 −
2(1−q)
2−q +
4−q
q(2−q) (−kC + λα2 )], ∂piC,4(q)∂q ≥ 0 when kI ≥ λ2 , and ∂piC,4(q)∂q ≤ 0 when kI ≤ λ2 . Therefore, profit of
C in Case 4 is non-monotone in q.
Equilibrium Case 5: piC,5 =
q
1−q (
kI−λ2+ 2(1−q)2−q + 4−3qq(2−q) (λα2 −kC)
4 )
2, which is a complicated fractional function of
q. It is non-monotone in q.
The union of feasible regions of Case 4 and 5 gives the condition in Proposition 2. Hence, we have Proposition
2.
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Given I’s optimal price the first equilibrium case (i.e. when C is deterred from entry), p∗I = pI,1 =
kC+
λ
2 (1−α), we compare it with pBI = 12 (kI+1+ λ2 ) > 12 . Since in this case, λα2 ≥ kC , we have pI,1 ≤ λ2 < 12 .
Because pBI >
1
2 , we have pI,1 < p
B
I
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Outline of the proof:
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Appendix section B gives the detailed consumer surplus analysis. Here, we look at Equilibrium case 4 (when
kC ∈ [λα2 − (1 − q), λα2 ]) and show how the consumer surplus and social surplus change when q tends to 0
compared with the benchmark case. In the benchmark case, we have CSB =
(τBI )
2
2 + (
λ
2 − 1)τBI + 12 , where
τBI =
1+kI
2 − λ4 . SSB = CSB + piBI , where piBI = ( 1−kI2 + λ4 )2. When kC ∈ [λα2 − (1 − q), λα2 ], we have
CS = 1−q2 (τI)
2 + (τI)(
λ
2 (1−α)− (1− q)) + 12 , where τI = 12(1−q) (1− q+kI − λ2 ). SS = CS+piI +piC , where
piI =
1
4(1−q) (−kI + λ2 + (1− q))2 and piC = 12(1−q) (λα2 − kC)(kI − λ2 + (1− q)). When q tends to 0, τI tends
to τB . Hence, CS tends to CSB − τBI λα2 = CSB − λα2 ( 1+kI2 − λ4 ). Since kI ≥ 0, λ, α ∈ (0, 1), we have the
term λα2 (
1+kI
2 − λ4 ) > 0. Similarly, when q tends to 0, piI tends to piBI . piC tends to τBI (λα2 − kC). Hence,
SS tends to SSB − τBI kC = SSB − kC( 1+kI2 − λ4 ). The term kC( 1+kI2 − λ4 ) is also strictly greater than 0.
Therefore, we have when q is sufficiently small, CSB > CS and SSB > SS. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
Proof. Outline of the proof:
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 can be proved similarly to the way we prove Proposition 1 and Proposition
2. We here directly refer the reader to Supplementary Appendix B which gives the full backward induction
analysis of Extension 1. Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 are natural results from the analysis.
We here firstly conclude the main results of backward induction analysis in Supplementary Appendix B.
1. When kI ∈ [kC , δkC + λδ2 (1− α)− 2(1− δq)], kC ≤ λα2 . C will not enter the market.
2. When kI ∈ [δkC + λδ2 (1−α)− 2(1− δq),min(2(1− δq) + δkC + λδ2 (1−α) + λ2 ,−3δkC + 3δλα2 + λ2 (1 +
δ) − 2(1 − δq))], C enters the market. pC = kI+2(1−δq)+3δkC−
λ
2 (1+δ−δα)
4δ piC =
1
16δ(1−δq) (kI + 2(1 −
δq)− δkC − λ2 (1 + δ − δα))2.
3. When kI ∈ [−3δkC+ 3δλα2 + λ2 (1+δ)−2(1−δq), λ2 (1+δ)+δλα−2δkC−(1−δq)], kC ∈ [λα2 −(1−δq), λα2 ],
C enters the market. pC =
λα
2 . piC =
δ
1−δq (
λα
2 − kC)2.
4. When kI ∈ [λ2 (1+δ)+δλα−2δkC−(1−δq),min(1−δq+ λ2 (1+δ), λ2 (1+δ)+ 12−δq ( 4−δqq (λα2 −kC)−2(1−
δq)))], kC ∈ [λα2 − (1− δq), λα2 ], C enters the market.pC = λα2 . piC = 11−δq (λα2 − kC)(
kI+1−δq−λ(1+δ)2
2 ).
5. When kI ∈ [min
{
max(λ2 (1 + δ) + δλα − 2δkC − (1 − δq), λ2 (1 + δ) + 12−δq ( 4−δqq (λα2 − kC) − 2(1 −
δq))), λα2
}
, 12−δq (2(1−δq)− δλα2 +δkC)+ λ2 (1+δ)], kC ∈ [λα2 −q(1−δq), 1], C enters the market. pC =
2q(1−δq)+(4−δq)kC+(4−3δq)λα2
4(2−δq) − λq(1+δ)8 + qkI4 . piC = q16(1−δq) (kI − λ(1+δ)2 + 2(1−δq)2−δq + 4−3δqq(2−δq) (λα2 −kC))2.
The only case when C does enter the market is when kI ∈ [kC , δkC + λδ2 (1 − α) − 2(1 − δq)], kC ≤ λα2 , i.e.
kI − δkC ≤ λ(1−α)2 − 2(1− δq), kC ≤ λα2 . We have Proposition 4.
Equilibrium Case 1: C does not enter the market.
Equilibrium Case 2: piC,2 =
1
16δ(1−δq) (kI + 2(1− δq)− δkC − λ2 (1 + δ − δα))2. ∂piC,2∂q = 116(1−δq)2 (kI − δkC −
λ
2 (1 + δ − δα) + 2(1 − δq))(kI − δkC − λ2 (1 + δ − δα) − 2(1 − δq)). Due to the boundary conation that
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kI ∈ [δkC + λδ2 (1−α)−2(1− δq),min(2(1− δq) + δkC + λδ2 (1−α) + λ2 ,−3δkC + 3δλα2 + λ2 (1 + δ)−2(1− δq))],
∂piC,2
∂q ≤ 0. Therefore, profit of C in Case 2 is decreasing in q.
Equilibrium Case 3: piC,3 =
δ
1−δq (
λα
2 − kC)2. The profit of C in Case 3 is easily to be seen as increasing in
q.
Equilibrium Case 4: piC,4 =
1
1−δq (
λα
2 − kC)(
kI−λ2 (1+δ)+(1−δq)
2 ).
∂piC,4
∂q =
1
2(1−δq)2 (kI − λ2 (1 + δ))(λα2 − kC).
Due to the boundary conation that kI ∈ [ld5 ,min(ld6 , ld9)], kC ∈ [ld4 , λα2 ], ∂piC,4(q)∂q ≥ 0 when kI ≥ λ2 (1 + δ), and
∂piC,4(q)
∂q ≤ 0 when kI ≤ λ2 (1 + δ). Therefore, profit of C in Case 4 is non-monotone in q.
Equilibrium Case 5: piC,5 =
q
16(1−δq) (kI − λ(1+δ)2 + 2(1−δq)2−δq + 4−3δqq(2−δq) (λα2 − kC))2, which is a complicated
fractional function of q. It is non-monotone in q.
We then have Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. 1. Benchmark case:
Consumer purchasing decisions
τBI is solved by τ
B
I · 1− pI + λ 1+τ
B
I
2 + δλ
1+τBI
2 = λ
τBI
2 + δλ
τBI
2 . We get τ
B
I = pI − λ(1+δ)2 .
Firm pricing decision
I maximizes its profit
piBI = (pI − kI)(1− τBI )
We have pBI =
kI+1
2 +
λ(1+δ)
4 . Hence pi
B
I = (
1−kI
2 +
λ(1+δ)
4 )
2; and τBI =
kI+1
2 − λ(1+δ)4 .
Consumer Surplus and Social Surplus
CSB ≡
∫ 1
τI
vi · 1− pI + λ1 + τ
B
I
2
+ δλ
1 + τBI
2
dvi + δ
∫ τC
0
λ
τBI
2
+ δλ
τBI
2
dvi =
1
2
+
(τBI )
2
2
+ (
λ
2
(1 + δ)− 1)τBI .
SSB = CSB + pi
B
I
2. Equilibrium case 4:
We have obtained pI =
kI+(1−δq)+λ2 (1+δ)
2 , piI =
1
1−δq (
1−δq+λ2 (1+δ)−kI
2 )
2. pC =
λα
2 . piC =
1
1−δq (
λα
2 −
kC)(
kI+1−δq−λ(1+δ)2
2 ); and τI =
1
1−δq (pI − λ(1+δ)2 ).
Consumer Surplus and Social Surplus
CS ≡
∫ 1
τI
vi · 1− pI + λ( (1− α)(1 + τI)
2
+
α
2
) + δλ(
(1− α)(1 + τI)
2
+
α
2
)dvi+δ
∫ τC
0
v · q − pC + λ((1− α)τI
2
+
α
2
)dvi
=
1
2
+
(1− δq)(τBI )2
2
+ (
λ
2
(1 + δ − δα)− 1)τBI .
SS = CS + piI + δpiC
When q tends to 0, τI tends to τ
B
I . Hence, CS tends CSB − δλα2 < CSB . When q tends to 0, piI tends to
piBI . piC tends to (
λα
2 − kC)τBI . Hence, SS tends to SSB − δkCτBI < SSB . This completes the proof.
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Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. We have already obtained pBI =
kI+1
2 +
λ(1+δ)
4 . When C is deterred from entry, we know I’s optimal
price is p∗I = δkC +
λ
2 +
λδ
2 (1 − α) from Supplementary Appendix B.pBI − p∗I = 12 (kI + 1 − λ2 (1 + δ). Since
kI + 1 > 1, and
λ
2 (1 + δ) ≤ λ < 1, we have pBI > p∗I .
B Analysis of Consumer Surplus when C is a Potential Entrant
Recall that the total utility U(vi) is given by
U(vi) =

vi · 1− pI + λ(α 1+τC2 + (1− α) 1+τI2 ), if vi ∈ [τI , 1],
vi · q − pC + λ(α 1+τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ), if vi ∈ [τC , τI ]
λ(α τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ), if vi ∈ [0, τC ].
Equilibrium Case 1: kC ∈ [0, λα2 ] and kI ∈ [kC , l1] In this case, only I is in the market. Consumer
vi’s surplus is, thus, vi · 1 − pI + λ · 1 where, pI = kC + λ2 (1 − α). Total consumer surplus is, thus,
CS1 ≡
∫ 1
0
vi · 1− pI + λ · 1dvi = 12 − kC + λ2 (1 + α)
Equilibrium Case 2: kC ∈ [0, λα2 ] and kI ∈ [l1,min(l2, l3)] In this case, both I and C are in the market.
τC < 0 and the market is fully covered. Consumer vi’s surplus is, thus,
U(vi) =
 vi · 1− pI + λ(α 12 + (1− α) 1+τI2 ), if vi ∈ [τI , 1],vi · q − pC + λ(α 12 + (1− α) τI2 ), if vi ∈ [0, τI ]
where, τI =
1
4(1−q) (2(1 − q) + kI − kC − λ2 (1 − α)), pI = 2(1 − q)τI) + kC + λ2 (1 − α), and pC =
kI+2(1−q)+3kC−λ2 (1−α)
4 = τI(1− q) + kC .
Total consumer surplus is, CS2 ≡
∫ 1
τI
vi · 1− pI + λ(α 12 + (1− α) 1+τI2 )dvi+
∫ τI
0
vi · q − pC + λ(α 12 + (1− α) τI2 )dvi =
1−q
2 τ
2
I + 2(
λ
2 (1− α)− (1− q))τI + 12 + λα2 − kC where, τI = 14(1−q) (2(1− q) + kI − kC − λ2 (1− α)).
Equilibrium Case 3: kC ∈ [l4, λα2 ] and kI ∈ [l3, l5] In this case, both I and C are in the market. τC = 0
and the market is fully covered. Consumer vi’s surplus is, thus,
U(vi) =
 vi · 1− pI + λ(α 12 + (1− α) 1+τI2 ), if vi ∈ [τI , 1],vi · q − pC + λ(α 12 + (1− α) τI2 ), if vi ∈ [0, τI ]
where, τI =
1
1−q (
λα
2 − kC), pI = (1− q)τI + λ2 , and pC = λα2 .
Total consumer surplus is, CS3 ≡
∫ 1
τI
vi · 1− pI + λ(α 12 + (1− α) 1+τI2 )dvi+
∫ τI
0
vi · q − pC + λ(α 12 + (1− α) τI2 )dvi =
1−q
2 τ
2
I + (
λ
2 (1− α)− (1− q))τI + 12 where, τI = 11−q (λα2 − kC).
Equilibrium Case 4: kC ∈ [l4, λα2 ] and kI ∈ [l5,min(l6, l9)] In this case, both I and C are in the market.
τC = 0 and the market is fully covered. Consumer vi’s surplus is, thus,
U(vi) =
 vi · 1− pI + λ(α 12 + (1− α) 1+τI2 ), if vi ∈ [τI , 1],vi · q − pC + λ(α 12 + (1− α) τI2 ), if vi ∈ [0, τI ]
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where, τI =
1
2(1−q) ((1− q) + kI − λ2 ), pI = (1− q)τI + λ2 , and pC = λα2 .
Total consumer surplus is, CS4 ≡
∫ 1
τI
vi · 1− pI + λ(α 12 + (1− α) 1+τI2 )dvi+
∫ τI
0
vi · q − pC + λ(α 12 + (1− α) τI2 )dvi =
1−q
2 τ
2
I + (
λ
2 (1− α)− (1− q))τI + 12 where, τI = 12(1−q) ((1− q) + kI − λ2 ).
Equilibrium Case 5: kC ∈ [l8, 1] and kI ∈ [min
{
max(l5, l9),
λα
2
}
, l10] In this case, both I and C are in the
market. τC > 0 and the market is not fully covered. Consumer vi’s surplus is, thus,
U(vi) =

vi · 1− pI + λ(α 1+τC2 + (1− α) 1+τI2 ), if vi ∈ [τI , 1],
vi · q − pC + λ(α 1+τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ), if vi ∈ [τC , τI ]
λ(α τC2 + (1− α) τI2 ), if vi ∈ [0, τC ].
where, τI =
2−q
4(1−q) (
2(1−q)+λα2 −kC
2−q − λ2 + kI), τC = τI − 14q(1−q) (qkI + 2q(1−q)2−q + 4−3q2−q (λα2 − kC) − λq2 ), pI =
1
2−q ((2(1−q)τI+kC− λα2 )+ λ2 , pC =
2q(1−q)+(4−q)kC+(4−3q)λα2
4(2−q) − λq8 + qkI4 = q(1−q)(τI−τC)+kC . Total con-
sumer surplus is, CS5 ≡
∫ 1
τI
vi · 1− pI + λ(α 1+τC2 + (1− α) 1+τI2 )dvi+
∫ τI
τC
vi · q − pC + λ(α 1+τC2 + (1− α) τI2 )dvi+∫ τC
0
λ(α τC2 + (1− α) τI2 )dvi = (1 − q)( 22−q − q − 12 )τ2I − q( 32 − q)τ2C + 2q(1 − q)τIτC +
{
λ
2 − 12−q [λα2 +
(1 − q)kC + 2(1 − q)]
}
τI + kCτC +
1
2 − 12−q (kC − λα2 ) where, τI = 2−q4(1−q) (
2(1−q)+λα2 −kC
2−q − λ2 + kI), τC =
τI − 14q(1−q) (qkI + 2q(1−q)2−q + 4−3q2−q (λα2 − kC)− λq2 ).
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